Full Length Research Paper

Influenza A (H1N1) Pandemic: Risk Perceptions and Vaccination Practices at Lund University, Sweden

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The 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic caused worldwide panic. Response to the pandemic varied widely between and within countries. The Swedish National Board of Health and Social Welfare responded by recommending vaccination of the entire population and a wide range of community mitigation measures. This study assessed the impact of the Swedish policy interventions. The study employed an internet-based questionnaire survey to collect data from master students on English programs at Lund University. The results show that majority of the respondents were aware of the pandemic and the Swedish government's recommended mitigation measures. The overall adoption of the recommended measures was low among the respondents. Vaccination uptake was 43.1%. The low uptake was attributed to vaccine safety concerns and low risk perceptions. Mitigation measures that were provided for free, and those that did not affect the daily routine received a high adoption compared to those that entailed spending money. The government's communication on influenza A (H1N1) was effective; however, some areas needed improvement to enhance adoption. It is imperative that communication about risk and benefits are communicated but with emphasis on the positive to avoid the dominance of the negative. In addition, group specific fora are necessary to address concerns.

Key words: Behaviour responses, influenza A (H1N1), pandemic, risk perceptions, vaccination practices.

INTRODUCTION

Influenza A (H1N1) can potentially cause indiscriminate pandemics (Dawood et al., 2009) that cannot be precisely predicted (Tsiodras et al., 2009; Balcan et al., 2009). For these reasons, it becomes difficult to determine which actions to take (Ong et al., 2009), which in turn, may lead to enormous challenges to the communities and the Healthcare systems. For example, in 1918 to 1919, the

influenza A (H1N1) in Spain was mild at its onset (Franco-Paredes et al., 2009); however, later on, its virulence increased which led to approximately 300 million cases and about 50 million deaths globally (Framco-Paredes et al., 2009; Schnitzler and Schnitzler, 2009). The 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was rapid in morbidity – it spread to four continents within a few weeks which prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare it as an emerging global pandemic (WHO, 2010). This study was conducted at a time when influenza A (H1N1) had been declared a global pandemic and had already caused over 15,174 deaths globally

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(WHO, 2010).There were 11,000 laboratory confirmed cases and 27 deaths in Sweden (*SMITTSKYDDSINSTITUTET*, 2010).

The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (*Socialstyrelsen*) responded to the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic by recommending vaccination of the entire population and also a wide range of community mitigation measures (Socialstyrelsen, 2009; Skåne Region, 2009). The vaccination process was conducted in a stepwise manner. It began with vaccinating the most vulnerable (e.g. pregnant women, children and those whose immunity were compromised because of other diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and obesity) and followed by vaccinating the rest of the population. The community mitigation measures included observance of sneeze/ cough etiquette, frequent hand washing, and social distancing (*Socialstyrelsen*, 2009; *Skåne* Region, 2009). The mass vaccination and community mitigation measures were aimed at preventing the spread of the disease as well as to reduce its impact.

The implementation process involved dissemination of information to the public through mass media, fliers, posters and direct letters to individuals (Skåne Region, 2009) on influenza A (H1N1). The disseminated information included the symptoms of the disease, vaccination, recommended community mitigation measures, and actions to take when one suspected that he/she had influenza A (H1N1) infection (*Socialstyrelsen*, 2009).

The strategies a country adopts in reducing risk (mitigation and preparedness), and for response and recovery from an eminent health disaster (e.g. a disease pandemic) should not start and end with the occurrence of that particular disaster, but it should be an on-going process. Thus, government should make advance plan on what steps to take in order to reduce the impact of any disaster before it occurs as well as during and after. This process is imperative in order to normalize the life of the community (Few and Matthies, 2006; Yesil, 2006; Abaya et al., 2009).

According to Franco-Paredes et al (2009), retrospective learning from earlier disease pandemics is important in enhancing a country"s capacity for preparedness to mitigate, respond, and recover effectively from any future pandemics. Also, according to Yesil (2006), we could learn lessons from either the past events that occurred in the particular country or similar events that were experienced by other countries (Yesil, 2006). In this context, this study was therefore conducted with the aim of contributing to the development of strategies for the prevention and reduction of impact from epidemics. To achieve this aim, the study focused on the assessment of the impact of the Swedish government"s policy interventions against the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic using the case study of students on master"s programs in English at Lund University. The specific research questions that were investigated are: 1) What is

the level of awareness and risk perceptions about the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and the recommended government interventions?; 2) What are the main information sources on Influenza A (H1N1) and their effectiveness?; 3) What actions did the community take in efforts to adopt the recommended influenza A (H1N1) intervention measures?; 4) What are the general lessons learned that can be applied in similar study setting or elsewhere?

Lund University was chosen as a study site because it was one of the institutions that had comprehensively implemented the government"s recommended interventions for the influenza A (H1N1). The university administration had sent out mails to students to raise awareness about the government"s recommended interventions including vaccination and community mitigation strategies. The administration also provided regular liquid soap and hand sanitizers which were placed in all toilet facilities in the campus accompanied with posters recommending their usage as well as usage instructions. The posters and usage instructions from the university were written both in Swedish and English.

Study setting

Lund University is situated in the Skåne region in southern Sweden (Figure 1). The university was founded in 1666, it is the largest institution for higher education and research in Sweden with approximately 46000 students. It is constituted of eight faculties (that is, Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Science, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Humanities and Theology, School of Economics and Management, Faculty of Fine and Performing arts). It also has a campus in Helsingborg, school of aviation, and many institutes as well as research centres. Students at Lund University on master"s programs in English originate from different countries; hence, making it a unique environment to conduct this study (Lund University, 2011).

METHODS AND MATERIALS

This was a cross-sectional internet-based survey (February 28th to March 10th, 2010) conducted among students studying at the master"s programs in English at Lund University.

As a first step, an internet web search through the official Lund University webpage was conducted. The aim of the web search was to: 1) build an inventory of all the faculties that offered master"s programs in English; 2) identify the specific English master"s programs in each of the faculties; and 3) identify the contact persons for each of the master"s programs and their e-mail addresses for communication purposes.

From the web search, the faculties that were identified and selected for inclusion in this study were: Social Science, Medicine, Law, Engineering and Science. The selection of the faculties and

Figure 1. Map showing location of Lund University.

the master"s programs in English was purposely conducted for two reasons: 1) to get a broad and cross-cutting representation and views from diverse academic fields particularly health, natural science, and social sciences; 2) to capture a diverse population of students from different countries, cultures and ethnicities (note that students in these programs were drawn from different countries). This process was undertaken in order to assess whether there were any similarities or differences in terms of responses to influenza A (H1N1) across different academic disciplines, nationalities or cultures.

After the web search, identification of the faculties, specific master"s programs and the contact persons and their e-mail addresses was completed, a communication to each identified program contact person was sent out. The sent out message introduced the survey and requested the designated contact person for permission to distribute the internet-based questionnaire to the students in the master"s programs. Upon obtaining permission, 485 email requests with a link to the internet based questionnaires were

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sent out to the students. This was achieved with the assistance of the program designated contact person. The e-mail to the students included introduction to the survey, a request to participate in the study, and a web link to the site of the internet-based questionnaires.

Ethical consideration

This study was conducted according to the Helsinki ethical principles of voluntary participation and informed consent for research on human subjects. Two introductory paragraphs on the first page of the survey questionnaire explained the purpose of the study, confidentiality, voluntary participation, anonymity, withdrawal, and consent to participate. Participants were free to withdraw from the study by clicking the button „Exit this survey" that appeared on top of each page of the survey questionnaire.

A willing respondent completed the questionnaire on the site and then submitted it by clicking on the button "thank u 4 ur time." By clicking this button, responses were automatically submitted and compiled by Survey Monkey software ProPlan, a web-based survey solution accessible online at www.surveymonkey.com. Out of the 485 requests that were sent out, 130 (27%) successfully completed surveys were compiled.

Study tool

The questionnaire was made up of both closed and open-ended questions. The main themes that were covered in the questionnaire were: 1) respondent"s demographic data; 2) awareness of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and recommended interventions; 3) sources from which respondents received information about influenza A (H1N1) and their effectiveness; and 4) respondents" risk perception to contracting influenza A (H1N1) and their adoption of the recommended intervention measures in order to prevent and reduce the disease impact.

Data analysis

The data was downloaded after completion of the survey and converted for application with Microsoft Office Excel 2007. The data in the excel file was then exported to Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 18- renamed PASW Statistics 18 for data editing and comparative analysis using descriptive statistics. Univeriate associations using cross tabulations and binary logistic regressions with a 95% confidence interval were conducted to assess associations between different predictors, and outcome variables. A p-value of <0.05 was considered significant. Additionally, we analysed the data sets particularly the open ended data using content analysis. The data sets were carefully read, coded and analysed on the basis of the main themes.

RESULTS

Demographic characteristics

The respondents constituted of 46 males (35.7%) and 83 females (64.3%). The basic details about the respondents are shown in Table 1 and the respondent nationalities in Table 2. The highest number of responses was received from students at the Faculty of Social

Science, 62.5% (80). Majority of the respondents were between 25 to 28 years of age. Over 82% of the respondents were not employed. None of the respondents reported to have been infected with influenza A (H1N1) during the 2009 epidemic or during their lifetime.

Awareness of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and recommended interventions

Majority of the respondents (99%) were aware of the 2009 global outbreak of influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. They expressed that it was a highly contagious disease that could be transmitted easily from one person to another. Some of the pathways that the respondents mentioned were sneezing, nose picking, handshakes, and touching influenza A (H1N1) contaminated objects.

Over 90% of the respondents were aware of the recommended intervention by the Swedish government and the actions taken by the Lund University management to prevent and reduce the impact of influenza A (H1N1). Some of the interventions that were mentioned included efforts to disseminate influenza A (H1N1) information to the wide audience using the media, healthcare, leaflets and posters, purchasing and stockpiling of antiviral drugs, and provision of free influenza A (H1N1) vaccination to all willing residents. They also mentioned the recommended community influenza A (H1N1) mitigation measures (e.g. frequent hand washing with soap and application of hand sanitizers, use of clean tissues when coughing/ sneezing, and social distancing).The Lund University on the other hand implemented the government policy by purchasing and providing free liquid soap and hand sanitizers to all toilets in campus – these were accompanied with usage instructions. The University also disseminated the government"s recommended interventions throughout the campus by use of posters and direct mails to students.

Sources from which respondents received information on influenza A (H1N1) pandemic

The sources from which the influenza A (H1N1) information was received by the respondents and their rated effectiveness[1] are shown in Figure 2. It could be depicted that there were many sources from which the respondents received information about influenza A (H1N1). However, internet, television, friends, posters and healthcare received higher scores in terms of their effectiveness. The least effective sources were radio and leaflets.

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[1]The rating is based on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is least effective and 5 most effective.

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of respondents.

Variables		No. of responses	N = 130 (%)
Sex	Male	46	35.7
	Female	83	64.3
	21-24	32	24.7
	25-28	60	46.5
Age	29-32	25	19.4
	33-36	6	4.7
	37 and above	6	4.7
	Law	9	7.0
	Medicine	24	18.7
Faculty	Science	7	5.5
	Engineering	8	6.3
	Social Science	80	62.5
Employment status	Yes	23	17.8
	No	106	82.2
	Less than 6 months	12	9.4
	6 to 12 months	42	32.8
Period of stay in Sweden	12 months to 2 years	40	31.3
	2 to 3 years	3	2.3
	3 to 4 years	1	0.8
	4 years and above	30	23.4

Table 2. Nationalities of respondents (n = 130).

Nationality	No. of respondents	Respondents (%)	Nationality	No. of respondents	Respondents
Albanian	1	0.8	Jordanian	1	0.8
American	4	3.1	Kenyan	1	0.8
Armenian	1	0.8	Korean	1	0.8
Australian	1	0.8	Lithuanian	3	2.3
Bangledesh	4	3.1	Malaysian	1	0.8
Belarusian	1	0.8	Mexican	2	2.3
Brazilian	1	0.8	Mexican/Swedish	1	0.8
Brazilian/Portugese	1	0.8	Nepali	1	1.5
British	4	3.1	New Zealand	1	0.8
Cameroonian	1	0.8	Nigerian	2	0.8
Canadian	5	3.8	Norwegian	1	0.8
Chilean	1	0.8	Pakistani	2	1.5
Chinese	6	4.6	Romanian	1	0.8
Danish	3	2.3	Russian Federation	2	1.5
Dutch	1	0.8	Scottish	1	0.8
Eritrean	1	0.8	Slovak	1	0.8
Ethiopian	2	1.5	South African	1	0.8
Georgian	2	1.5	Swedish-Argentinian	1	0.8
German	6	4.6	Swedish	23	17.7
Ghanian	1	0.8	Trinidadian	1	0.8

Table 2. Contd.

Latin American	1	0.8	Turkish	4	3.1
Icelandic	4	3.1	Ugandan	2	1.5
Indian	2	1.5	Ukrainian	4	3.1
Iranian	2	1.5	US and Australian	1	0.8
Iraqi	1	0.8	USA	6	4.6
IT	1	0.8	USA and South African	1	0.8
Italian	1	0.8	Vietnamese	1	0.8

Figure 2. Rated averages for effectiveness of source of information on influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.

Respondents' risk perception and actions to adopt the recommended influenza A (H1N) intervention measures

Respondent's perception to be at risk of contracting influenza A (H1N1)

Almost 67% of the respondents perceived themselves to be at high risk of contracting influenza A (H1N1) during the pandemic; whereas, the remaining 33% perceived they were at low risk of contracting the disease. Risk perception responses did not indicate any unique pattern between those who perceived themselves to be at risk or those who did not and their nationalities.

Vaccination against influenza A (H1N1)

Majority (95%) of the respondents were aware about the recommendation for all students and the public to be vaccinated free of charge against influenza A (H1N1). In this category, 80% acknowledged having received an official letter from the healthcare centres inviting them for vaccination. The rest did not receive a letter or were not able to recall having received one. Surprisingly, only 43% of the respondents were vaccinated against influenza A (H1N1). Those who were vaccinated were motivated with the desire to protect self (87%), their family members, and friends (61%). Further, few respondents had vaccination because they received the invitation letter and some cited the influence of close friends. In comparing gender differences against vaccination uptake, it did not reveal any significant statistical association (OR 0.871, 95%CI 0.347 to 1.756, p-value = 0.550).

Respondents who were aware (56%) of the recommendation for vaccination but did not get vaccinated, gave varying reasons as shown in Figure 3. It can be depicted that the concern about adverse reaction, and perception of some respondents to be at low risk of

**Figure 3.** Reasons for not taking influenza A (H1N1) vaccine.

Figure 4. Illustrates reported behaviour changes by participants in response to the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.

contracting the influenza A (H1N1) were the most important factors that contributed to low vaccine uptake. Others include: never received invitation letter, missed vaccination appointment, lack of time for queuing up and preference for natural immunity to vaccine-induced one.

Respondents' behavioural changes adopted to recommended influenza A (H1N1) community mitigation measures

The respondents" behavioural changes in response to the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic are shown in Figure 4. As shown, the respondents adopted diverse strategies. It is worth noting that a respondent applied mixed strategies in adopting these recommended mitigating measures. Three main findings can be deduced from the figure. Firstly, it is shown that those strategies that involved the use of mitigation measure items that were provided free of charge such as usage of liquid soap and hand sanitizers at the faculties" toilet facilities were the most popular and were adopted by over 80% of the respon-dents. Additionally, about 70% of the respondents washed their hands with soap and water more than usual. A logistic regression analysis comparing gender differences with the uptake of the mitigation measures revealed that female respondents were more likely to have washed their hands with soap and water more than

usual compared to their male counterparts (OR 2.421, 95%CI 1.026 to 5.715, p-value = 0.044).

Secondly, it is indicated that those mitigation strategies that entailed cost to the respondents (e.g. bought hand sanitizers for home use, increased cleaning and disinfection of surfaces, and use of clean tissue for sneezing and coughing) were less popular and adopted by less than 50% of the respondents. To reiterate, over 82% respondents were unemployed which may imply the affordability or purchasing power could be the main barrier. Meanwhile, female respondents were more likely to have used tissues while coughing or sneezing compared to the male respondents (OR 3.669, 95%CI 1.511 to 8.914, p-value = 0.004). Lastly, it is shown that the social distancing behavioural changes (e.g. keeping away from crowded places, and stopping handshakes with friends) were the least adopted.

Comparing risk perceptions with adoption of recommended interventions

A content analysis of the risk perception of responses did not indicate any unique pattern between those who perceived themselves to be at risk or those who did not, and their nationalities. Similarly, logistic regression analysis did not show significant statistical association between risk perceptions and vaccination uptake (aOR[2] 0.990, 95%CI 0.415 to 2.360, p-value 0.981). Meanwhile, risk perceptions were significantly associated with hand washing with soap and water more than usual. Respondents who reported low risk perceptions were less likely to have washed hands with soap and water more than usual (aOR 0.345 95%CI 0.135 to 0.885, P-value = 0.027).

DISCUSSION

The results reveal that the majority of the respondents were aware about the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) global pandemic, and the Swedish government"s recommended mitigation measures. However, despite the high level of awareness, the adoption of the recommended mitigation measures was found to be low. Firstly, majority of the respondents declined to be vaccinated against influenza A (H1N1). Secondly, the adoption of those community mitigation measures that entailed cost to the respondent was low compared to those provided free by the institution. The main reasons for the low adoption of the government"s recommendations were found to be:
1) concern about vaccine safety; and 2) perception to be at low risk of contracting influenza A (H1N1). Extending from these findings, one question emerges: What lessons

can we learn to enable us to improve future mitigation strategies for pandemics?

The results have shown that over 90% of the respondents were aware of the global 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, and the Swedish government"s recommendations for prevention and impact reduction. The respondents did not only show knowledge about the presence of the H1N1 pandemic but also knew the major disease transmission pathways (e.g. handshaking, sneezing, coughing and contaminated surfaces) – these are among other ways through which the virus is known to be transmitted (Aburto et al., 2010). They also mentioned the major interventions that were recommended by the Swedish government (e.g. vaccination of entire population, cough/sneeze etiquette, hand washing and social distancing) – these recommendations corroborated with some of those found at Swedish official site (Socialstyrelsen, 2009). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Swedish government"s communication strategies on the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was comprehensive and effective. However, there are a number of areas that need to be addressed to improve the impact of the interventions in relation to adoption of the recommendations. This is imperative in disease prevention and reduction of its health and associated socio-economic impacts on the community.

The concern about vaccine safety was found to be one of the important factors that contributed to low vaccine uptake among the respondents. The fears around vaccine safety and its probable adverse impacts could be attributed to the historical memory of the neurological problems that resulted from the use of whole-cell vaccination for influenza A (H1N1) in the U.S.A. in 1976 (Barry, 2005). According to Covello et al. (2001), issues with known victims from past experience are rarely accepted since their negative memory is often thought to pose greater risks than perceived benefits.

Therefore, when dealing with issues like influenza A (H1N1) vaccine, it is vital to provide sufficient information to the public not only on the positive benefits, but also on any potential negative impact. Furthermore, as per Covello et al. (2001), when a communication raises high concern, the arising issues must not be ignored, but should be addressed simultaneously to counter any negative outcome. To reiterate, our respondents" were aware about influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, transmission pathways, and major interventions for its mitigation and impact reduction. Moreover, risk perception did not show any statistical significant association when compared to vaccination uptake. Therefore, it seems that the issue of vaccine safety and its potential impact (both positive and negative) was given low priority.

Risk perception of influenza A (H1N1) was significantly associated with the Swedish government"s recommended community mitigation measures particularly with frequent hand washing. This finding is in line with Rubin et al.

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[2] aOR - Odds ratios adjusted for age and sex

(2009) and Jones and Salathé (2009) behavior adoption studies which found that influenza A (H1N1) risk perceptions mediated behavior change – individuals who perceived to be at high risk were more likely to adopt recommended behavior. Therefore, it is not surprising that the majority of the respondents who perceived themselves to be high risk were more likely to have adopted the mitigation measures such as hand washing with soap and water more than usual compared to those respondents who perceived to be of lower risk.

To improve adoption of any recommended pandemic mitigation measures, it is important that the message does not only reach the audience but rather efforts be made to ensure that the message is simple and clear for understanding (Mileti and Peek, 2000; Covello et al. 2001; Gilk, 2007). To ensure that the message is understandable, the benefits and any negative impacts that can be anticipated from each recommended mitigation measure must be made clear and explicit. The negative impact must not just be stated. Sufficient information to guide informed judgment such as whether the adverse impact are reversible, uncertain, long-term/short-term, life-threatening and others must also accompany the communication (Covello et al., 2001). Considering that negative information often has higher affinity for retention in the mind than the positive one (Maslow, 1970), the adverse effects must be stated in a manner that does not cause „outrage" (Covello et al., 2001). Therefore, when communicating, there should be a clear balance between the positive and negative impact of any intervention. According to Wilson and Crouch (1987) as well as Fischhoff (1989), emphasizing the positive would help counter the possibility of the negative impact dominating the minds of the recipients of the message.

In addition to the information being understandable, many studies (Covello et al., 2001; Chess et al., 1995; Mileti and Peek, 2000; Gilk, 2007) emphasize that trust related to the information received by the recipients play a very important role in determining whether recommendations are adopted or not. Further, according to Chess et al. (1995) and Covello et al (2001), failing to acknowledge the negative impact and not disclosing useful information in time are among important factors that can adversely affect the trust that people will attach to the information. The US Environment Protection Agency (1990) has shown that person or institution through whom the message is communicated affects the trust people will bestow on the message. During the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in Mexico, the government managed to gain public support and trust by using the Minister of Health in frequent live update about the pandemic. They also provided toll free telephone lines for inquiries on pressing issues or questions about influenza A (H1N1) from the public (Cordova-Villalobos et al., 2009). Making the update live as well as frequent, enabled the public to be informed about the progress. It

also enabled them to have similar source of information and therefore, they did not rely on rumors and speculation. Giving an opportunity for one-on-one toll free inquiry lines ensured that any issues that would have hampered public response were cleared.

Limitations

Our results may not be generalisable, given the low response rate. The method of data collection favored mostly those who had personal computers and access to internet. Public computers could only be used once – because the survey was designed to identify the IP address and consequently allowed only one survey to be administered per IP. In addition, we did not send out reminders which could have increased participation. Although, these restrictions were intended to avoid double responses, they most likely affected the response rate. Another limitation in our study is the possibility of recall bias since our participants were required to recall certain events. Nevertheless, we think this was minimal due to the fact that the study was conducted when the WHO pandemic alert was phase 6. Finally, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of self selection bias as having contributed to low response given the sensitivity of the pandemic during the study period.

Conclusions

It is concluded that the Swedish government"s communication about the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) was comprehensive and effective. However, the adoption of the recommended strategies among our study participants was low – including both vaccine uptake and most of the other community mitigation measures. To improve the adoption of any future interventions for mitigating epidemics, it is important that several areas are addressed as mentioned subsequently. Balance positive benefits and any potential negative impacts for each recommended strategy. However, it will be advantageous to emphasize more on the positives to avoid negative dominance. Provide frequent small forums that are tailored to small groups where the public and health professionals can interact and share information. In the process, issues of public concern can be gathered and addressed in frequent live public update through a trusted institution or person.

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